The Netherlands: the public development of land by Krabben, E. van der et al.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.





The Netherlands: the public development of land 





Planning practice in the Netherlands largely relies on public land development, 
which is at the core of the municipalities’ strategies to achieve their planning goals. 
Dutch local governments have always played an active role in acquiring 
(agricultural) land, servicing that land for future building and supplying it to home 
builders and other users. The main reason that they have adopted this role is that 
‘they want to steer development in a pro-active way and that they want to earn 
money to finance the costs of public works like streets, sewage systems and public 
space that are necessary for new urban development’ (Needham, 2007: 181). 
The aim of this contribution is to assess the public land development model as it is 
used in the Netherlands in the context of the developments that have taken place in 
Dutch local land markets since the 1990s, when market circumstances on the Dutch 
land and housing market changed. We believe that the developments that took place 
in Dutch local land markets may yield wise lessons for local governments in other 
European countries about embracing a public land development strategy. Only 
specific circumstances may justice such a strategy.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses public land development 
in the Netherlands: its background, goals and achievements until the 1990s. Section 3 
critically assesses the advantages and disadvantages of this development strategy. 
Section 4 describes the developments on the land market in the Netherlands since the 
1990s and the changing roles of municipalities and private actors in this market  and 
evaluates the effectiveness of public land development as a planning strategy. In 
section 5 we conclude with some lessons that can be learnt from the Dutch case. 
 
2. Public land development in the Netherlands 
 
The public land development model encompasses a public developer – usually the 
municipality, though in the Netherlands the provincial and national government may 
serve this role as well - who buys all the land to be developed, readjusts the parcels 
into forms suitable for the desired development, and sells those parcels. The income 
from the land development comes from selling the building plots (Needham & 
Verhage, 1998; Needham, 2007; Groetelaers, 2004; Van der Krabben & Needham, 
2008). Dutch municipalities have always felt responsible for the development of 
land. The earliest public initiatives started with the large land drainage projects 
hundreds of years ago (Needham, 2007). However, the ‘modern’ public land 
development model came about in practice after World War II, when there was a 





huge demand for new housing and also land for industrial use.  To assure that 
sufficient land would be available municipalities took up the task themselves. In a 
way, building land was considered to be analogous to other public utilities like roads, 
sewage systems and energy provision.  
It is likely that more recently private land developers or large building construction 
firms could have taken over the land development role. However, the situation 
remained as it was for a long time for several reasons. First is the municipalities’ 
quest for control. Municipalities wanted to have guarantees that their land-use plans 
would be implemented in the way they envisioned them (the pro-active planning 
argument). Based on the former Spatial Planning Act89, municipalities could in their 
land-use plans allocate land for a certain use (i.e. housing), but they were not able to 
distinguish between different types of housing (social housing versus owner 
occupied housing). However, as the land owner municipalities could sell the building 
land to selected buyers for specific purposes. So, for example, housing associations 
(public housing authorities) could be targeted to take up the task of land ownership 
for the purpose of building large amounts of social housing. Second, the public land 
development model offered municipalities financial benefits. It gave them the 
opportunity to recoup all the costs of their investments in the public investments that 
were necessary for the development, by making sure that the selling prices of the 
building sites generated sufficient income to cover all their costs. Those public works 
often included inexpensive land for uses such as social housing, schools and  public 
parks. In many instances,  municipalities were able to make a profit from land 
development. Those profits were used again to invest in new, less-profitable projects. 
In situations where the financial outcome of land development appeared to be 
negative, municipalities could always adjust the plan (higher densities, less social 
housing) to improve the financial situation. (Whether that is a matter of good 
planning is something else!). 
Nobody knows exactly how much money municipalities actually make from land 
development. Korthals Altes (2008) showed that on average municipalities seem to 
make a lot of money out of land development.90 However, the situation can differ 
among municipalities. Examples are also known of municipalities that lost a lot of 
money with public land development .91  
Finally, most private developers appreciated the land development role of the 
municipalities. Public land development guaranteed them good-quality locations to 
build on – if necessary, municipalities would make use of their eminent domain 
powers and pre-emption rights to assemble all land that was necessary – it reduces 
the developers’ risks and the private developers primarily earned their money with 
the building of new homes (and not with developing land). 
                                                     
89 The new Spatial Planning Act has been implemented in 2008 and changed this situation: see section 3. 
90 For example, in 2005, 12 per cent of local government income came from land development revenues 
(Korthals Altes, 2008; cited in Buitelaar, 2010). 
91 A recent report by Deloitte Real Estate Advisory shows that all Dutch municipalities together might lose in 
2010 over € 3.0 billion on public land development due to additional rental costs, because the demand for 
building land has dropped (Deloitte Real Estate Advisory, 2010). 





To understand better why all stakeholders in land and property development have 
been more or less pleased with the public land development in the Netherlands, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the conditions under which public land 
development took place until the early 1990s. First, the public land development 
model does not imply that municipalities hold a monopoly on land development.  
However, most homebuilders were not interested in land development, because the 
costs of making the land available and servicing it was too high. Particularly in the 
Western part of the Netherlands (the Randstad region) the costs of land drainage 
investments were often substantial. Municipalities were able to carry out these works 
on a large scale, which made the costs acceptable for them (economies of scale 
occurred). Second, the Compulsory Purchase Act (Onteigeningswet) allows 
municipalities to use eminent domain powers ‘in the interests of spatial planning and 
housing’, for instance to implement a land use plan. The owner’s disagreement with 
the contents of a land use plan will not help him very much in an appeal relative to 
compulsory purchase.92 Compensation is paid based on the real value of the property 
(the price in a free market transaction). In practice,  though, municipalities only very 
occasionally have to use eminent domain powers (Buitelaar, 2010). Hold-out 
problems do not occur very often. However, it seems that the relatively strong 
eminent domain powers help municipalities to carry out their land development 
strategies: landowners sell voluntarily because they know that they will be 
expropriated otherwise. Third, for a long time municipalities have been able to 
acquire (agricultural) land for residential or industrial use relatively cheap, for a cost 
that is just above the price of agricultural land. The landowners (farmers) accepted 
those prices; they were probably unaware of the real market or residual value of their 
properties (Needham, 1997; 2007).93 And fourth, most municipalities were not very 
much aware of the full market value of the building sites that they sold to 
homebuilders (Needham, 1997; 2007). Usually, they sold the building sites against 
cost price (the total costs of acquiring and servicing the land), in effect giving away 
part of the market value to the homebuilders. 
Public land development is certainly not an exclusively Dutch phenomenon. Other 
countries, including France, Sweden and Finland, also make use of this practice 
(Alterman, 2009). It seems, however, that this practice in other countries has not 
attracted the same attention from academics as it did in the Netherlands, probably 
because in those countries the strategy is not as dominant as in the Netherlands and 
because public land development has not encountered the same problems as in the 
Netherlands. 
 
                                                     
92 There is however one specific situation in which compulsory purchase is not possible: when the owner can 
claim that he is able to carry out the development himself, the municipality will not be able to make use of its 
eminent domain powers. In the 1990s private developers successfully made use of this right (see section 4). 
93 Note that the real market value of land was still rather low, because of the large share of affordable housing 
(‘social housing’) in house building construction. 





3. How to achieve spatial planning goals: can land market strategies offer a 
useful tool? 
 
For an assessment of the Dutch public land development model from the outside, we 
refer to a study, more than thirty years ago, by Lefcoe (1977). Lefcoe’s main goal 
was to investigate the use of public land development as a strategic tool for 
American cities. While not aiming to give a full assessment of the Dutch model, 
Lefcoe nevertheless puts a number of interesting question marks on the model. The 
first question mark concerns the tools of local governments to achieve public land 
development goals. Lefcoe’s basic argument is that if a country prefers public land 
development (for whatever reason), than governments should have the appropriate 
powers to act in that way. In the Netherlands local governments act as public land 
developers, but private developers are not restricted  from doing so as well. Lefcoe 
(1977: 221) argues that ‘(…) where, as in the Netherlands, municipalities are 
accustomed to developing, one might expect that property owners of exurban land 
would enjoy no right whatsoever to urbanize their sites (…)’. This would give local 
governments near monopoly of all land development. In Lefcoe’s opinion, there is no 
reason to think, without such a monopoly, that governments could succeed in 
achieving their goals. They might lose to competition from private developers who 
are willing to pay a higher price for agricultural land. Additionally, he argues that 
governments should be able to make use of eminent domain powers against present 
use values supporting public land development, instead of allowing land owners to 
be expropriated against full market values, including a certain amount of ‘hope’ 
value, as is the case in the Netherlands.94 
The second issue with respect to Dutch land development practice raised by Lefcoe 
is related to what is called in the Netherlands the ‘two-hats dilemma’(dubbele petten 
problematiek). Needham (2007, p. 184) explains it as follows: ‘the municipality 
wears the hat of a statutory planning agency which is supposed to enact approved 
planning policy; and it wears the hat of a land developer who has invested huge 
amounts in the location’. The dilemma for the municipality is that certain decisions 
with respect to land use may be good for achieving planning goals, but have a 
negative effect on the returns of their land development practice. The real problem, 
of course, occurs when a municipality makes a decision that is good for  
development profit but bad for planning. Lefcoe warns about the latter situation: 
‘(…) if governments were seeking to earn profits as land developers there is no 
reason to assume that they would behave any differently from the way profit-
maximizing firms act in today’s market’ (1977: 183). Moreover, ‘(i)f governments 
were also land developers in their own right, (…) they would be tempted to 
                                                     
94 Remarkably, at the time that Lefcoe published his article the Dutch Cabinet had to resign, because the coalition 
partners were not able to agree on a new draft expropriation law. The PvdA (Labour Party) wanted to introduce 
‘present value’ as compensation value for expropriation, instead of ‘fair market value’, but the CDA (Christen 
Democrats) did not agree. The expropriation law was not changed with respect to this issue and land owners still 
receive fair market value as compensation for expropriation. 





compromise their role as environmental regulators, especially in applying restraints 
to their own development activities’ (ibid). 
Third, Lefcoe questions the effectiveness of public land development as a 
mechanism to recoup the costs of public works: ‘(…) one might argue that, if 
transferring land gains from private pockets to public coffers is the goal, taxation 
seems a far better way to do so. The government can tax without putting public 
money at risk in the land market’ (1977: 169).  
Fourth, and related to the previous point, the Dutch way of public land development 
entails considerable financial risks. Needham (2007, p. 182) also points out the risks 
of the public land development model: ‘(t)ens of millions, sometimes hundreds of 
millions, of Euros, are spent by municipalities, an expenditure which must be 
recouped, often many years later, by selling the land’.  As mentioned above, Dutch 
municipalities are able to make money, but there are many examples of 
municipalities that also lost a lot of money through public land development (see 
note 4). In the second half of the 1970’s, many municipalities invested in acquiring 
land for future industrial park development. When the economic crisis of the early 
1980’s caused a reduction of the demand for industrial land, some of those 
municipalities lost substantial amounts of money because of the interest charges they 
had to pay (Needham, 2007). 
And finally – though it can be considered both as negative and positive – the public 
land development model leads to a large degree of uniformity in Dutch urban 
developments. Lefcoe claims that ‘(w)ithin each municipality, Dutch expansion areas 
are often uniform in appearance because the city itself is responsible for installing all 
infrastructure, from paving the roads to landscaping the fire station. Efficiency and 
predictability argue for a high degree of repetition in the design of all public 
facilities’ (1977: 241). 
4. What happened on the Dutch land market since the 1990s 
 
For a long time, Dutch municipalities were quite successful in using public land 
development as a pro-active planning tool. However, the conditions under which this 
took place began to change dramatically in the early 1990s. To explain the 
developments on the Dutch land market since then – to a certain extent ‘predicted’ 
by Lefcoe - it is useful to distinguish between the land market for suburban 
greenfield development  and the land market for downtown urban redevelopment. 
 
4.1. The land market for suburban greenfield development 
Until the early 1990s public land development remained the common development 
model for residential suburban development. However, around 1994, the situation 
quite suddenly changed. The changes on the land market since that time have been 
analyzed and described quite extensively, because it came as a shock to Dutch 
planners (Nooteboom & Needham, 1995; De Greef, 1997; Korthals Altes & De 
Graaf, 1998; Verhage, 2003; Priemus & Louw, 2003; Groetelaers, 2004; Needham, 





2007). First, a strong increase in the demand for owner occupied housing took place 
(low interest rates; very ‘accessible’ mortgage conditions; large growth of the 
number of households; a delayed demand). This resulted not only in a strong growth 
of housing prices (because of a delayed response of the supply side), but it also made 
this sector much more interesting for the homebuilding industry. Because of the 
increase in housing prices, the value of building land increased greatly as well. 
Commercial developers became, for the first time, interested in strategically 
acquiring (future) building land: ‘(t)he development gain to be enjoyed by buying 
unserviced land became big enough to compensate for the risks (Needham, 2007: 
193). 
Those developments were in fact initiated by the national government’s new national 
policy document on spatial planning (VINEX: VROM, 1992) that restricted future 
housebuilding to a number of designated locations close to all major cities (the so-
called VINEX locations). ‘… (B)y deliberately creating a scarcity of housing land, 
the price would increase, so municipalities would be able to make a greater profit on 
the land development, and with that profit would be able to pay for servicing to a 
higher quality’ (Ibid.: 193). Quite unexpectedly, but perhaps not so surprisingly 
afterwards, commercial developers took advantage of this opportunity and actively 
started to acquire land on the VINEX locations. 
In this new situation, both municipalities and commercial developers still preferred 
an integrated ‘area-based’ development of the VINEX locations, instead of a 
‘project-based’ development led by landownership of the commercial developers. As 
a result, a new pro-active development model came into existence, with full approval 
of both the public authorities and the private sector: the so-called building claim 
model.  On most VINEX locations, the commercial developers agreed to sell their 
(recently acquired undeveloped land) to the municipality, against a price more or less 
similar to their costs to acquire it. The municipalities continued with their role as 
public land developers and sold, after servicing the land, building sites against full 
market value to the same commercial developers. The full market value enabled 
municipalities to maintain a high plan quality. What had changed, however, was that 
the commercial developers had sold their undeveloped land to the municipalities 
under the condition of a building claim: they successfully claimed the right to build 
owner-occupied housing in the VINEX location. The size of that right – the number 
of houses that they would be allowed to build – depended on the amount of land that 
they sold to the municipality. The strong and continuing increase of housing prices, 
combined with the high plan quality, guaranteed for them (huge) profits on house 
building. 
Those developments have led to completely changed conditions in the land market. 
First, the bargaining position of municipalities in respect to the commercial 
developers was bad. Municipalities could not make use of their eminent domain 
powers in the case of commercial developers holding land (see note 5). Moreover, 
when a commercial developer wanted to develop its land on the VINEX location 
privately, a legal basis for cost recovery of the public works in the remaining part of 





the location was missing (those commercial developers were called free riders). In 
practice, it meant that many commercial developers were able to get the most out of 
their building claim. Second, the building claim model prevents a competitive market 
for building sites (which was of course the intention of the landholding commercial 
developers). And third, the developments since 1994 have led to an increased 
‘awareness’ of the value of landed property, on the part of agricultural land 
(farmers), commercial developers and municipalities. As a result, the costs of 
acquiring agricultural land for residential development has increased sharply (Luijt et 
al., 2003), at the same time reducing the profitability of public land development and 
the resources for municipalities to invest in plan quality. 
To improve the position of the municipalities on the land market, in 2008 a new 
Spatial Planning Act was adopted (MinVROM, 2008).95 The part of the Spatial 
Planning Act that is relevant in the context of the above discussion concerns two 
main topics96. The new Spatial Planning Act contains a new legal basis for cost 
recovery of public works, even if the municipality is not holding the land and, 
moreover, it gives municipalities better options to guide development (including the 
option to include social or affordable housing – and not ‘just’ housing – in land-use 
plans). The latter implies that a municipality may force landholding private 
developers to include affordable housing development in their development plans. 
Those legal chances have improved the bargaining position of municipalities to 
commercial developers, but, quite remarkably, have not (yet) changed planning and 
development practice (Buitelaar, 2010).  The new statutory powers of municipalities 
give them the possibility to achieve planning goals without making use of a public 
land development strategy. However, most municipalities continue to make use of a 
public land development strategy (Buitelaar, 2010), despite the financial risks and the 
continuing negative impact on the competitiveness of the land market, mainly 
because they want to keep control over developments. 
 
4.2 The land market for downtown urban redevelopment 
The implementation of the Land Development Act may have improved the 
effectiveness of public land development for residential greenfield developments. 
New problems have appeared however in urban redevelopment projects. Now that 
many of the Dutch cities have shifted their attention from residential greenfield 
development to targeting a substantial part of housing production in urban 
redevelopment areas97, they are facing again difficulties with executing public land 
                                                     
95 Note that this new Spatial Planning Act came almost 15 years after the first changes in land market conditions 
took place, while most of the VINEX locations have now been developed or are under development based on 
public private partnership agreements that cannot be changed anymore. 
96 The renewing of the former Spatial Planning Act served more purposes. A more comprehensive discussion of 
this act is, however, beyond the scope of this paper (see De Wolff, 2007; Needham, 2007). 
97 In 2004, the Dutch Government set a target that 25 to 40% of all residential development should take place 
within the existing built-up area. Buitelaar et al. (2008) show that most cities succeeded in achieving this target, 
with some even above 40%. 





development strategies. However, these difficulties are of a different order than the 
problems with greenfield developments. 
Local governments’ public land development strategies in urban redevelopment areas 
are risky, among other things because of the high costs they must pay for acquiring 
land and properties (the proposed developments cause high ‘hope values’) and the 
duration of the project. Moreover, the bargaining position of the municipalities is 
weak, because all properties must be acquired. Expropriation powers are at hand, but 
not easy to use. Finally, the new instrument for cost recovery works well for 
greenfield developments, but not in all cases for urban redevelopment: if the 
financial results of the project are unfavorable, additional costs of public works 
cannot be recovered, because it would make the financial result even worse.98 
Again, a debate has started regarding the necessity that municipalities should adjust 
their strategies to the changing market circumstances (Needham, 2007; Van der 
Krabben & Needham, 2008; Buitelaar et al., 2008; VROM Raad, 2009; Buitelaar, 
2010). Four alternative strategies have been proposed so far to overcome the above 
problems. First, Buitelaar et al. (2008) have suggested that municipalities should 
adopt a more ownership sensitive redevelopment strategy: the content of plans could 
be adjusted to the ownership situation instead of adjusting the ownership situation to 
be able to implement the plan. In other words, properties that cannot be acquired 
easily, could be excluded from the redevelopment project. 
Second, several changes in the current – recently implemented – regulation with 
respect to cost recovery and development gains are already under consideration by 
the Ministry of Spatial Planning (VROM Raad, 2009). One suggestion has been to 
change the expropriation  law (expropriation against existing use value instead of 
market value, thus excluding the impact of hope values). And another proposal has 
been to tax development gains that occur after land use change. It is anticipated that 
this kind of changes in planning law will improve public land development, because 
the attractiveness of private ownership of land will diminish.99 
Third, Van der Krabben & Needham (2008) have suggested introducing urban land 
readjustment as a new tool in the Netherlands for urban redevelopment projects, 
following planning practice in countries like France, Germany and Israel (see the 
contribution by Van der Krabben in chapter 3.6 of this book). 
Fourth, perhaps the most obvious way to deal with these problems is to abandon the 
public land development strategy and to allow more private initiatives for urban 
redevelopment. As is argued above, the Dutch Land Development Act – though so 
far ‘interpreted’ in a different way – legally guarantees recovery of the costs of 
public works in such private sector-led redevelopment projects, without the public 
ownership of land. 
                                                     
98 In the contribution by Van der Krabben (chapter 3.6 in this book) those problems are discussed in more detail. 
99 Note however that even in the Dutch planners’ paradise planning law will not easily be changed in this way, 
because of the considerable impact on private property rights. 





5. Concluding remarks 
 
The discussion of the Dutch experience with public land development since the 
1990s has shown that the threats to this development model have been borne out. 
First, once private developers find out that land assembly can be a very effective 
strategy to achieve their housebuilding goals, local governments lack the appropriate 
powers to continue their public land development strategy efficiently. Second, 
negative impacts of the ‘two hats dilemma’ – when municipalities favor financial (or 
economic) considerations over spatial planning goals – may be hard to prove and it 
must be noted that there is no evidence of such behavior with respect to residential 
development; however, though beyond the scope of this paper, we should mention 
that Dutch municipalities failed to distinguish properly between their different ‘hats’ 
with respect to industrial land policies in the past three decades, clearly 
demonstrating what can go wrong with municipalities wearing two hats (Needham & 
Louw, 2006; Van der Krabben & Van Dinteren, 2010; Van der Krabben & Buitelaar, 
forthcoming). In order to attract new companies and to earn back as soon as possible 
their investments in the development of industrial parks, many municipalities have 
abandoned their strict containment policies which they apply for residential 
development. Publicly owned and developed industrial land has been supplied in 
large quantities  – in sharp contrast with residential land –  and sold below market 
values by municipalities, to win the competition with neighboring municipalities 
over attracting relocating industrial firms. Third, the application of a public land 
development strategy in urban redevelopment projects increasingly reveals the 
inability of the strategy to recoup all the costs of public works. It seems that the 
impact of the strategy on ‘hope values’ in urban redevelopment areas, increasing the 
redevelopment costs and  reducing the profitability of the development, increasingly 
impedes full cost recovery. And finally, though not much is known about the 
financial risks (and losses) of Dutch municipalities in their role of public land 
developers, there is some recent evidence that municipalities face high risks in times 
of economic downturn. The most recent financial and economic crisis and the 
accompanying substantial drop in the demand for building land have already brought 
some of the larger Dutch cities into (deep) trouble and seems to bring forward now 
the worst case scenarios for Dutch municipalities, leading to substantial financial 
losses on their land development activities (see note 4). 100   
The arguments that support an active role of municipalities on the land market that 
have been brought forward seem to have lost at least part of their strength. 
Nevertheless, there may still be good reasons to improve the effectiveness of 
planning.  We believe that some of the ‘reasons’ for public land development can be 
                                                     
100  Several newspapers have reported recently on the considerable losses some of the bigger Dutch cities made 
on their land development activities. Binnenlands Bestuur (2010) reports, for instance, financial losses over 2009 
on land development in Rotterdam (€ 70 million), The Hague (€ 132 million) and Utrecht (€ 48 million). The 
City of Amsterdam still showed a positive results over the 2009 activities on the land market (€ 88 million), but 
has already reported expected losses over land development in the next years amounting to € 360 million. 





‘solved’ in different ways (and not necessarily via a public land development 
strategy). With respect to the cost recovery argument, alternative instruments, like 
taxation, might do a better – and less risky – approach. With respect to the provision 
of good-quality locations  argument – there is not much evidence elsewhere that the 
private sector fails to produce market-rate building land whenever there is a need for 
it. However, with respect to the pro-active planning argument, we believe that there 
might be specific circumstances in which public sector land development might be 
an effective tool. 
We can identify at least three of those specific circumstances. First, in undeveloped 
markets land banking strategies, directed to the purchase of vacant and abandoned 
properties in blighted areas, have proved to be effective tools for the renewal of 
urban land. Evidence of that can be found, for instance, in American cities 
(Alexander, 2005). Note that land bank authorities are not land developers in the way 
Dutch cities are (as described above). They do not take care of the demolishment of 
the properties, the servicing of the land and, if necessary, the reparcelling of it into 
new building sites. Land banking strategies can, however, be extremely useful to 
generate / initiate new developments in blighted urban areas.  
Second, forms of land assembly and land banking can be effective tools in providing 
inexpensive land for affordable housing. Alterman (2009) provides an extensive 
overview of all the land-policy instruments that governments may use to recapture 
the “unearned increment” in land values (created by public planning decisions) for 
financing affordable housing production. In addition to instruments like inclusionary 
housing programs, public land development policies have proven able to ‘produce’ 
affordable housing in large quantities at below-market rates , in the Netherlands, but 
also in Sweden and Finland (Alterman, 2009: 11).  
Third, public land development, in the way the Dutch make use of this strategy, may 
be a useful tool for the redevelopment of brownfield areas, but then used in a more 
selective way. Brownfield areas are often so difficult and risky to redevelop that 
nothing will happen without pro-active government interventions. To generate 
private investments, public land development in a part of the redevelopment area 
might be a useful strategy. It takes away part of the risks for private investors and 
may set off private sector development initiatives in other parts of that areas.  
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